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V

JURISDICTION
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (Supp. 2008). The Supreme Court granted appellant's petition
for interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, on
December 8, 2009.

ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Issue. Did the district court err in ruling that Olsen's claim for

reimbursement of attorney fees was not precluded by his failure to comply with the
requirements of the Governmental Immunities Act of Utah, specifically Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-7-902, where Olsen failed to request a defense from Eagle Mountain and failed to
timely submit a request for reimbursement?
2.

Standard of Review. The denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed for

correctness, granting no deference to the district court. In re I.K., 2009 UT 70. Under
Rule 12(b)(6), the factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and those
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party. See Moss v. Pete Suazo Utah Athletic
Com'n, 175 P.3d 1042 (Utah 2007). Thus, a motion to dismiss is appropriate where it
clearly appears that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under the facts alleged or
under any set of facts he could prove to support his claim. Millet v. Logan City, 147 P.3d
971 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). The same standard applies to motions brought pursuant to
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Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Peterson v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 42 P.3d 1253 (Utah Ct. App. 2002).
3.

Issue raised below. Eagle Mountain moved to dismiss Olsen's claims on

the grounds that he failed to comply with the procedural requirements of the
Governmental Immunities Act of Utah. (See Motion and Memorandum in Support,
Record at 24-42). The district court denied the motion. (See Order, Record at 76-79).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the case. Plaintiff/Appellee Brian Brent Olsen ("Olsen") was a

former Mayor of the City of Eagle Mountain ("Eagle Mountain"). On or about October
23, 2006, the Utah County Attorney's Office charged Olsen with seven counts of misuse
of public money while serving as Mayor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-402 (the
"Criminal Case"). On September 25, 2008, after a four day trial, a jury returned a verdict
of not guilty on all seven counts.
On October 29, 2008, some 34 days post-acquittal, Olsen submitted a written
request for reimbursement of $119,834.90 in alleged attorney fees and costs claimed
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) (2008). Eagle Mountain took no action on the
request, and on February 4, 2009, Olsen filed a complaint in the Fourth District Court.
2.

Course of proceedings.

Eagle Mountain moved to dismiss the

complaint for failure to state a claim and lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that Olsen
failed to comply with the Governmental Immunities Act of Utah ("GIAU").

{00085894.DOC /}
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3.

Disposition at trial court.

The trial court denied Eagle Mountain's motion

to dismiss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Olsen is a former Mayor of Eagle Mountain. On or about October 23,
2006, the Utah County Attorney's Office charged Olsen with seven counts of misuse of
public money while serving as Mayor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-402, all
third degree felony counts. (Complaint, Record at 1). Olsen resigned as Mayor just prior
to the announcement of the charges. On September 25, 2008, after a 4 day trial, a jury
returned a verdict of not guilty on all seven counts. (Complaint, Record at 2). On
October 29, 2008, some 34 days post-acquittal, Olsen submitted a written request for
reimbursement of $119,834.90 in alleged attorney fees and costs claimed pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) (2008). (Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss,
Exhibit A, Record at 42). Eagle Mountain took no action on the request, and on February
4, 2009, Olsen filed a complaint seeking reimbursement in the Fourth District Court.
(Complaint, Record at 1-2).
In order to recover under the reimbursement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 56-2201(1), Olsen was required to comply with certain procedural requirements set forth in
the GIAU. Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 (2008) provides: UA request for reimbursement
of attorney fees shall be filed in the manner provided in Sections 63G-7-902 and 63G-7903." Section 63G-7-902 ("Section 902") and Section 63G-7-903 ("Section 903") are
provisions of the GIAU which set forth a number of specific obligations, conditions and
{00085894.DOC /}
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duties between governmental entities and their employees with respect to third party
claims.
Under specified conditions, Section 902 provides, inter alia, that a governmental
entity "shall defend any action" brought against its employees arising from their
employment. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(l) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, before a
governmental entity may undertake to defend its employees against a claim, the
employee is required to timely submit a written request to the governmental entity to
defend the employee. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(a) (emphasis add). If the
employee fails to submit the request, or the request is not timely, the governmental entity
is not required to defend the employee and is relieved from further liability. See Utah
Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(b). Under certain conditions, the governmental entity may
also decline to defend an action against an employee or defend under a reservation of
rights. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(3) & (6). Finally, Section 903 sets forth certain
conditions whereby an employee may recover against the governmental entity for
judgments previously paid by the employee.
In his Complaint, Olsen failed to allege compliance with the procedural
requirements and conditions set forth in Section 902. (Complaint, Record 1-2). Olsen
acknowledged that he did not make any type of written request or written demand on
Eagle Mountain to defend the Criminal Case. (Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Record at 43-47). Further, Olsen acknowledged that his
first written request for reimbursement of attorney fees was not made until October 29,
{00085894.DOC /}
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2008, some 34 days after Olsen was acquitted. (See Id.; see also, Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss, Exhibit A, Record at 42).
Accordingly, Eagle Mountain moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that
Olsen failed to comply with the statutory requirements of the reimbursement statute as set
forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-6-202 and 63G-7-902(2). The district court denied Eagle
Mountain's motion to dismiss and this interlocutory appeal followed.
APPLICABLE STATUTES
The statutes central to this motion are Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) (2008), Utah
Code Ann. § 52-6-202 (2008) and relevant portions of Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902
(2008).l
Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) provides:
If a state grand jury indicts, or if an information is filed
against an officer or employee, in connection with or arising
out of any act or omission of that officer or employee during
the performance of the officer or employee's duties, within
the scope of the officer or employee's employment, or under
color of the officer or employee's authority, and that
indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or results
in a judgment of acquittal... that officer or employee shall be
entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs
necessarily incurred in the defense of that indictment or
information from the public entity.
Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 provides:

Copies of the pertinent statutes cited herein are included in the addendum attached
hereto in their entirety.
{00085894.DOC /}
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A request for reimbursement of attorney fees and court costs
shall be filed in the manner provided in Sections 63G-7-902
and 63G-7-903.
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902 provides, in pertinent part:
(1)
Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a
governmental entity shall defend any action brought against
its employee arising from an act or omission occurring:
(a)

during the performance of the employee's

duties;
(b)
within the scope of the employee's
employment; or
(c)

under color of authority.

(2)(a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee
against a claim, the employee shall make a written request to
the governmental entity to defend the employee:
(i)

within ten days after service of process upon the
employee; or

(ii)

within a longer period that would not prejudice
the governmental entity in maintaining a
defense on the employee's behalf; or

(iii)

within a period that would not con flict with
notice requirements imposed on the entity in
connection with insurance carried by the entity
relating to the risk involved.

(2)(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails to
reasonably cooperate in the defense, including the making of
an offer of judgment under Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Offers of Judgment, the governmental entity need
not defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay any
judgment, compromise, or settlement against the employee in
respect to the claim.
{00085894.DOC /}
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pursuant to the plain language of the statutes at issue, Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-6202 and 63G-7-902, Olsen was required to request a defense from Eagle Mountain within
10 days after he was served with the criminal information. Olsen admittedly never
requested a defense. Instead, Olsen claims that the requirements of Section 902 are not
applicable in criminal cases. However, Olsen5s interpretation would render Utah Code
Ann. § 52-6-202 completely meaningless. Furthermore, a review of the history of
amendments to the reimbursement statute demonstrates that the Legislature specifically
designated the GIAU procedures in Section 902 to apply to requests for reimbursement of
attorney fees, rather than the more general "notice of claim" provision contained within
the GIAU at Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401.
Olsen further claims that under the reimbursement statute, Section 52-6-201, his
claim for reimbursement did not arise until his acquittal; thus, he was required only to
submit a written request for reimbursement in order to comply with Section 902.
However, even accepting Olsen's assertion, the request was untimely. Olsen's written
request for reimbursement was not submitted until October 29, 2008, some 34 days after
his acquittal, and thus, far beyond than the ten (10) day requirement set forth in Section
902. Because Olsen cannot demonstrate compliance with the procedural requirements of
Section 902, his Complaint should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

{00085894.DOC /}
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ARGUMENT
Although Olsen was required to submit a request for defense of the Criminal Case
in order to perfect his claim for reimbursement of attorney fees in the event of acquittal,
Olsen admits that he never made that request. According to Olsen, he was not required to
request a defense because: (1) the procedures of Section 902 are not applicable to
criminal actions; and (2) because the right to payment of attorney fees is for
reimbursement and not a defense, such right does not mature until the time of acquittal.
Hence, Olsen asserts that his written request for reimbursement submitted on October 29,
2008, 34 days after acquittal, was sufficient to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202
and Section 902.
Not only is Olsen's interpretation contrary to the plain language of the relevant
statutes, but it would result in rendering Section 52-6-202 completely meaningless.
Moreover, even accepting Olsen's assertion that his reimbursement claim did not arise
until his acquittal, Olsen's request was nevertheless untimely. Olsen had 10 days to
submit a written request for reimbursement under Section 902, and his October 29, 2008
letter was not submitted until 34 days after acquittal.
Because Olsen cannot demonstrate compliance with GIAU Section 902, the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claim. See Suazo v. Salt Lake City
Corp,, 168 P.3d 340 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (proper "notice of claim" under the GIAU
must be filed to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction); Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632
(Utah 2002) (same). Therefore, Olsen's claim should be dismissed as a matter of law.
{00085894 DOC/}
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I.

OLSEN WAS REQUIRED TO REQUEST A DEFENSE.
A.

The Plain Language Of The GIAU Specifies That Olsen Request A
Defense.

Section 902 of the GIAU provides that a governmental entity "shall defend any
action" brought against its employees arising from their employment. Utah Code Ann. §
63G-7-902(l) (emphasis added). However, before a governmental entity may undertake
to defend an employee against a claim, the employee is required to timely submit a
written request to the governmental entity to defend the employee. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-7-902(2)(a). This naturally implies that the request must be made before the
defense is rendered.
By the plain language of the relevant statutes, Olsen was required to request a
defense. Olsen's claim for attorney fees is premised on the reimbursement statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 52-6-201. However, in order to recover under this statute, all requests for
reimbursement of attorney fees "shall be filed in the manner provided in Sections 63G-7902 and 63G-7-903." See Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202. Sections 902 and 903 are
specific sections of the GIAU which require that an employee meet the specified
conditions, as well as follow the specified procedure, in order to perfect a claim for
attorney fees.
A straightforward reading of GIAU Section 902 confirms that the Legislature
intended that defense and indemnification of government employees would be
conditioned on fulfillment of certain obligations by the employee, including, at a
{00085894.DOC /}
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minimum, the timely submission of a written request for a defense. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 63G-7-902(2)(a). If the employee fails to submit the request, or the request is not
timely, the governmental entity is not required to defend the employee and is relieved
from further liability for the claim. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-902(2)(b).
Eagle Mountain has found no cases directly on point interpreting these statutes.
Nevertheless, the principles of statutory construction are well established under Utah law.
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Perrine v. Kennecott Min. Corp., 911 P.2d 1290,
1292 (Utah 1996):
[T]his Court's primary responsibility in construing legislative
enactments is to give effect to the Legislature's underlying
intent." West Jordan v. Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah
1982); see also Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2 ("The statutes ... of
this state ... are to be liberally construed with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.").
Generally, the best indication of that intent is the statute's
plain language. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., Ill P.2d
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). Thus, we will interpret a statute
according to its plain language, unless such a reading is
unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant
contravention of the express purpose of the statute. West
Jordan, 656 P.2d at 446.
Perrine, 911 P.2d at 1292. Furthermore, where the meaning of a statute is plain, the
Court should enforce the statute by reference to the "usual and accepted meaning" of its

2

In Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890 (Utah 1996), Davis County asserted the
same procedural defect as a defense to a claim for attorney fees where the employee
failed to make a written request for a defense of a criminal charge until after trial. The
issue was not decided, however, because Davis County failed to raise the defense until
the matter was on appeal and the Court found any defect was waived. Salmon, 916 P.2d
at 894 at fn. 3.
{00085894 DOC/}
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terms. See DeLand v. Uintah County, 945 P.2d 172, 174 (Utah 1997); Clover v.
Snowbird Ski Resort, 808 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Utah 1991); Chris & Dicks'Lumber v. Utah
State Tax Comm % 791 P.2d 511,514 (Utah 1990).
Numerous cases have held that the GIAU (and its predecessor, the Utah
Governmental Immunities Act) must be strictly construed. See, e.g., Hall v. Utah State
Dept. of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 965 (Utah 2001); Suazo v. Salt Lake City Corp., 168
P.3d 340 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); Wheeler v. McPherson, 40 P.3d 632 (Utah 2002); see
also, Nielson v. Gurley, 1994, 888 P.2d 130, (Utah 1994) (interpreting Utah
Governmental Immunities Act). For example, a party must strictly comply with the
GIAU's notice of claim requirement, even if the governmental entity at issue has actual
notice of the claim. Hall, 24 P.3d at 965. In other words, "where the government grants
statutory rights of action against itself, any conditions placed on those rights must be
followed precisely." Id. Under a strict interpretation of the plain statutory language of
Section 902, Olsen was required to request a defense.
B.

Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 Must Be Given Effect.

It is well settled that a court should seek "to render all parts of a [statute] relevant
and meaningful" and avoid interpretations that "will render portions of a statute
superfluous or inoperative." Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958, 963
(Utah 2001) (citations omitted) (allowing governmental immunity to bar Whistleblower
Act claims would eviscerate the Act by preventing any real enforcement); Madsen v.
Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1989) (in interpreting statutes, Court has fundamental duty
{00085894.DOC /}
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to give effect, if possible, to every word of statute). Furthermore, the court should
assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly by the Legislature. See Platts v.
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658 (Utah 1997) (overruling court of appeals1 narrow
construction of the inclusive language "others rendering similar care and services" on
grounds that such construction eviscerates, if not eliminates, any effect that language
might have).
Olsen asserts that Section 902 is inapplicable to criminal cases. However, Olsen's
interpretation of the statute leaves one critical question unanswered: Why did the
Legislature specify that the procedures in "Sections 63G-7-902 and 63G-7-903" apply to
claims for reimbursement of attorney fees? Clearly, the reimbursement statute itself
applies solely to criminal cases. If Section 902 were applicable only in civil matters, then
the language of Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-202 would be rendered completely meaningless.
If, as Olsen suggests, the reference to the GIAU was simply to refer to the "manner" in
which a claim shall be filed, i.e. "making a written request to the governmental entity,"
then the Legislature could have simply stated so. Surely the Legislature did not enact
Section 52-6-202 for no purpose whatsoever.
Olsen challenges the application of Section 902 to criminal cases based on its use
of terminology more commonly associated with civil cases. Yet, any of the terms in
Section 902 can be reasonably interpreted by applying the criminal analog.
For instance, in this case, the criminal charges were commenced by the filing of an
information and the issuance of a summons. The information and summons were then
{00085894.DOC /}
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served on Mr. Olsen, in a manner analogous to service of process in civil matters. See
Rule 6(c)(3), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (requiring that a summons shall be
served "as in civil actions," or by mail). Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the
time period to provide a written request for a defense to Eagle Mountain was triggered
upon service of the summons. The reasonable meaning of service of process is simply
when the case has been initiated. Other terms in the statute can be similarly interpreted.
Judgment is reasonably understood as a criminal judgment, including fines, restitution or
other payments of money imposed on a criminal defendant. The terms "compromise"
and "settlement" as applied to criminal cases are circumstances specifically addressed by
the reimbursement statute itself. See Utah Code Ann. § 52-6-201(1) & (2) (2008)
(excluding reimbursement for attorney fees for indictment or information, or portions
thereof, quashed upon application or motion of the prosecuting attorney).
Further, the reimbursement statute is not the only instance where the Legislature
has enacted pre-trial procedures to accomplish a similar goal. A comparable statutory
procedure was enacted for the reimbursement of attorney fees and costs in Article V
lawsuits against public officers. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-7-201 to 52-7-204. Under
this procedure, a public officer is entitled to "reimbursement" of attorney fees and costs
in defending an Article V lawsuit only if the officer provides the Legislative Management
Committee with notice of the claim, the retained attorney, and estimated rates and fees to
defend the case. See Utah Code Ann. § 52-7-202.

{00085894.DOC />
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Since Olsen's interpretation would, in effect, nullify Section 52-6-202, it should be
rejected.
C.

The Legislature Purposefully Selected The GIAU Procedures in
Section 902 Rather Than The Notice of Claim Procedure.

Although there is no recorded legislative history concerning enactment of the
reimbursement statute, a review of the history of its original language in 1977 and later
amendments in 1983 and 1986, demonstrates that the Legislature clearly intended that the
procedures in Section 902 apply to criminal cases.
The attorney fees' reimbursement statute was first examined in Hulbert v. State,
607 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1980). In Hulbert, the plaintiff sought to recover attorney fees
incurred in the successful defense of 12 indictments. After trial, plaintiff submitted his
notice of claim to the State of Utah pursuant to the notice of claim provision of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act (the predecessor to the GIAU).3 After expiration of the 90day statutory period for a response, the claim was deemed to be denied and Hulbert filed
a claim in the district court. Hulbert, at 1218.
Hulbert asserted that his claim was reviewable by the district court based on the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. According to Hulbert, the "notice
of claim" procedure applied, which expressly provided for jurisdiction in the district
court. The 1977 version of the reimbursement statute stated: "This act shall apply to

3

The Utah Governmental Immunity Act was repealed on July 1, 2004, and replaced
by the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah on the same date. See Tuttle v. Olds, 2007
UTApplO,fn2.
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claims arising prior to the effective date of this act so long as those claims are filed in the
manner provided in the Utah Governmental Immunity Act." Hulbert at 1218-19 (citing
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30a-3 (1977), a predecessor to Utah Code § 52-6-202); see also,
Record at 58. The State of Utah disagreed and asserted that the Utah Constitution,
Article VII, Section 13, providing for jurisdiction vesting in the Board of Examiners
limited Hulbert to that forum, and that no jurisdiction or review was available in the
district court. The State argued that the language in the reimbursement statute (1977
version) merely required an employee to submit a "notice of claim" to the State Board of
Examiners. Accordingly, the State claimed that the specific procedures set forth in the
GIAU, including those provisions providing for jurisdiction and review by the district
court, did not apply to a claim for reimbursement.
The Supreme Court, affirming the District Court, agreed with Hulbert and held
that the language in the reimbursement statute was not intended to be so limited. As the
Court noted, "it would have been a simple matter to designate the section number of the
Governmental Immunity Act (e.g., the "notice of claim" provision) and stipulate those
provisions solely were to apply to a claim under Section 63-30a." Hulbert 607 P.2d at
1219. The Court noted that the term "manner" is defined as the mode or method in which
something is done or happens, and interpreted the statute as "prescribing the mode of
procedure set forth in the Governmental Immunity Act." Id. The Court found that
Hulbert complied with the appropriate procedures by complying with the "notice of
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claim" procedure as set forth in the Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, the district
court had jurisdiction. Id.
Subsequently, in 1983, after the Hulbert decision, the Legislature amended the
reimbursement statute to read: "[a] request for reimbursement of attorney fees and court
costs shall be filed in the manner provided in Section 63-30-11." See Utah Code Ann. §
63-30a-3 (1983) (Record at 60). In 1983, Section 63-30-11 was the operative "notice of
claim" provision of the UGIA, and provided for the filing of a Notice of Claim with a
governmental entity prior to initiating suit in the district court. See Utah Code Ann. § 6330-11 (1983) (Record at 62). Thus, in 1983, the "notice of claim" procedure required
only that a claimant submit a basic written request, or "notice," in order to perfect a claim
for reimbursement of attorney fees. Although over time there have been amendments to
the "notice of claim" procedure,4 the "notice of claim" procedure remains a part of the
present GIAU, as enacted in 2008. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-401 (2008).
Tellingly, in 1986, the reimbursement statute was amended yet again. This time,
the language was changed to state: "[a] request for reimbursement of attorney fees and
court costs shall be filed in the manner provided in Sections 63-30-36 and 63-30-37."
See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30a-3 (1986) (Record at 66) (emphasis added). Rather than
referring generally to the Utah Governmental Immunities Act, as in the 1977 version or
to the specific "notice of claim" procedure as in the 1983 version, for this amendment,

4

For example, reducing the time period to respond to a Notice of Claim from 90
days to 60 days)
{00085894.DOC /}
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the Legislature designated specific code sections of the Governmental Immunities Act.
The designated sections, 63-30-36 and 63-30-37, were subsequently renumbered to
Sections 63G-7-902 (Section 902) and 63G-7-903 (Section 903) in 2008.5 Thus, instead
of requiring claims for reimbursement to be submitted using a simple "notice of claim"
procedure, the Legislature deliberately specified the procedures and conditions to be
followed, now set forth in Sections 902 and 903, including the requirement that an
employee must present a written request to the governmental entity for a defense at the
inception of the case.
Thus, based on a review of the history of amendments to the reimbursement
statute with respect to the procedure for perfecting a claim, there is no question that the
Legislature specifically intended that Sections 902 and 903 apply to claims for
reimbursement of attorney fees. For Olsen to suggest otherwise completely ignores the
direct, purposeful action of the Legislature in response to the Hulbert decision.6 Contrary
to Olsen's proposed interpretation, the Legislature did not exempt criminal actions from
the requirements of Section 902.
By specifying the application of Section 902, the Legislature sought to provide the
governmental entity the opportunity to employ its own counsel or arrange for competent
5

For the court's convenience, copies of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-36 and § 63-30-37
(1983) were included in the Record at 63-64. These sections were subsequently
renumbered and reorganized, with slight modifications, into the present Utah Code Ann.
§§ 63G-7-902 and 63G-7-903 (2008), respectively.
6

As the Court noted in Hulbert, "it would have been a simple matter to designate
the section number of the [GIAU] and stipulate those provisions solely were to apply to a
claim under [the reimbursement statute]." Hulbert, 607 P.2d at 1219.
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independent counsel, control costs and the amount of attorney fees incurred, and
investigate and evaluate the claim. Obviously, legal fees may be substantial and a
governmental entity would necessarily include such items in its budget process. By
applying the procedures of Sections 902 and 903 to criminal actions, the Legislature
foresaw the need to involve a governmental entity in the defense at the inception of a
criminal case against an employee, rather than after trial or upon acquittal. The
Legislature simply sought to apply the procedure already set forth in the GIAU to
criminal cases, for the purpose of ensuring that a governmental entity is significantly
involved in defending its employees, rather than requiring the employee to simply "make
a written request" for reimbursement.
The Legislature's specific purpose is further evidenced by the reference to Section
903 as part of the procedural requirements of the reimbursement statute set forth in
Section 52-6-202. Section 903 applies to those situations where a governmental entity
has declined to provide for or arrange for a defense of an employee, and the employee
hires counsel or pays a judgment that the governmental entity is obligated (under certain
conditions) to pay. If, as Olsen argues, the references to Sections 902 and 903 were
merely to require that an employee claiming reimbursement of attorney fees to make a
written request to the governmental entity after acquittal, then the inclusion of Section
903 would be completely superfluous. Of course, the Legislature could have specified
the "notice of claim" procedure, as it did in the 1983 version of the reimbursement
statute.
{00085894.DOC /}
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The application of Section 903 is consistent with interpreting the reimbursement
statute to require that Olsen request a defense under Section 902. For example, should
the governmental entity decline to defend the case, after notice is provided in accordance
with Section 902, then the employee may recover his attorney fees and costs incurred in
the employee's defense upon acquittal. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-903(2) (2008).
The history of amendments to the statute demonstrates that the Legislature
purposefully intended to provide the governmental entity with options at the inception of
a criminal case against an employee. Once an employee makes a demand or provides
notice of the intent to seek reimbursement, the governmental entity is free to provide for a
defense, provide for a defense under a "reservation of rights," or deny the claim entirely
and be subject to the reimbursement requirement if the employee is acquitted. To the
extent the employee chooses not to demand a defense, the employee is free to hire
counsel of his choice and proceed according to his wishes, but loses the right of
reimbursement. The Legislature's purpose in applying the procedures of GIAU Section
902 was clearly to provide the governmental entity with the opportunity to have a role in
the process. Olsen disregarded the procedure and those safeguards entirely, at his own
election, and consequently, his claim for reimbursement should be dismissed.
D.

Strictly Enforcing The GIAU Procedural Requirements Supports The
Purpose Of The Act

One important purpose of the Legislature behind enacting Section 52-6-201 and
Section 902 is to encourage qualified persons to serve as public officials without
{00085894 DOC/}
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incurring the risk of exposure to exorbitant legal fees to defend ill-founded actions,
including criminal actions. See Lyon v. Burton, 5 P.3d 616 (Utah 2000) (Requiring
governmental entity to provide a defense protects employee from financial loss).
However, an employee's right to a government-funded defense is not an unfettered right
to privately retain counsel and seek reimbursement, unless the government entity has
declined to defend the case. On the contrary, Section 902 of the GIAU provides
procedural protections to the governmental entity in order to limit its exposure to
unfounded claims. Cf. Nunez v. Albo, 53 P.3d 2 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (Primary purpose
of notice of claim provision is to afford the responsible public authorities opportunity to
pursue a proper and timely investigation of merits of claim and to arrive at a timely
settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding expenditure of public revenue for costly and
unnecessary litigation). Allowing Olsen to skirt these procedural requirements would
deflate the purpose of the Act.
The opportunity denied Eagle Mountain to either defend Olsen, or arrange for a
defense against the criminal charges, is not inconsequential. Eagle Mountain was
prejudiced from having no involvement in negotiating or contracting for the defense, its
costs, or potential resolution without need for trial. Permitting an employee to proceed
without notice to the employer, as happened here, would completely eliminate the
governmental entity from participating in the defense of a claim. As a result, the very
purpose of these provisions (i.e., to provide the governmental entity the opportunity to
employ its own counsel or arrange for competent independent counsel, control costs and
{00085894.DOC /}
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the amount of attorney fees incurred, and investigate and evaluate the claim) would be
wholly ineffective. Section 902 protects the governmental entity from the potential for
exploitation by an employee. For example, shortly before trial or shortly after acquittal, a
criminal defense attorney, knowing he would be reimbursed, could substantially increase
his fees and/or add additional "result" fees post- acquittal, all without the knowledge or
control of the governmental entity. Prior agreement by the governmental entity would
avoid these types of problems.
Moreover, the procedural requirements of Section 902 are not burdensome or
unique. Analogous provisions have been routinely enforced in the insurance context.
For example, insurance policies often contain a similar notice requirement wherein an
insured must present a potential claim to the insurance company and request a defense.
Where an insurance company has been prejudiced by the failure to provide notice and by
the denial of its ability to investigate and participate in the defense of a claim, the
insured's claim may be denied. The reason for this is clear. Where the insurer no longer
has the opportunity to resolve or settle the claim, and was denied the opportunity to
'
See e.g., Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987)
(insureds1 failure to notify insurers of claims and request indemnity therefor until
approximately five years after claims occurred precluded insurers1 liability); AOK Lands,
Inc. v. Shand, Morahan & Co., 860 P.2d 924 (Utah 1993) (Insured's failure to notify
"errors and omissions" insurer until after eight years of litigation had concluded and
$400,000 judgment against insured was in place relieved insurer of its obligation under
the policy; insurer was prejudiced in being deprived of opportunity to participate in any
way in defense of suit"); Utah Transit Authority v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 WL
2992715 (D.Utah 2006); see also, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-312(2) (2005) ("[fjailure to
give notice or file proof of loss as required by [the insurance policy] does not bar
recovery under the policy if the insurer fails to show it was prejudiced by the failure").
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employ its own counsel or control costs and attorney fees, it is unfair to hold the insurer
liable to indemnify the insured. Busch, 743 P.2d at 1220-21.
Similarly, it is unfair to hold a governmental entity liable for judgments or
outcomes in which it was denied an opportunity to present a defense, and was prejudiced
by that denial.
II.

OLSEN'S POST-ACQUITTAL SUBMISSION OF HIS REQUEST FOR
REIMBURSEMENT WAS UNTIMELY.
Even accepting Olsen's assertion that his claim for reimbursement did not arise

until he was acquitted on September 25, 2008, Olsen's claim nevertheless fails because
his written request for reimbursement was not submitted until October 29, 2008, some 34
days after his acquittal.
According to Olsen, the reference in Section 52-6-202 to filing a claim for
reimbursement "in the manner provided in Sections 902 and 903" simply refers to the
manner in which a claim shall be filed, e.g., by "making a written request to the
governmental entity." Again, even assuming that Section 52-6-202 can be so narrowly
construed, Olsen cannot pick and choose which portions of 902 that he finds are
applicable. Clearly, Section 902 requires that the "written request" submitted to the
governmental entity must be made "within ten days." Utah Code Ann. 63G-7902(2)(a)(i). Because Olsen's request was untimely, his Complaint should be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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CONCLUSION
Because Olsen failed to request that Eagle Mountain defend the Criminal Case and
his written request for reimbursement of attorney fees was untimely, the Supreme Court
should reverse the district court and Olsen's claim should be dismissed for failure to state
a claim and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted this JIQ day of January, 2010.
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS

A Profession<u\Corporation

d£

Gerara H JjCingporn
Catherine NQ. Brabson
Attorneys ity* Defendant/Appellant
City of Eagle Mountain
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned does hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT along with a CD containing an electronic copy
of the Enhanced Courtesy Brief and PDF of the Addendum was hereby served via
U.S. first class mail, postage prepaid, on this<^^n day of January, 2010 to the following:

M. David Eckersley
PRINCE, YEATS & GELDZAHLER

City Center I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

cy^^/y)nfmaJmc—
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M. David Eckersley (0956)
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 524-1000
Electronic Mail: mde@princeyeates.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

BRIAN BRENT OLSEN,
ORDER
Plaintiff,

Case No. 090400584
EAGLE MOUNTAIN CITY,
Judge Gary D. Stott
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came before the Court for hearing on August 20,
2009. Plaintiff was present and represented by his counsel, M. David Eckersley. The
Defendant was represented by Gerald Kinghorn. After having reviewed the memoranda of
the parties and hearing oral argument, the Court hereby enters the following:

fEATES
AHLER
Suite 900
X) South
eCity
\ 1000

ORDER
The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby denied.
DATED this k Vof

^~Jh

. 2009.

BY THE COURT

Fourth Judicial District
-"mM

Approved as to Form:
PARSONS KINGHORN HARRIS

GERALD H. KINGHORN

CE, YEATES
•LDZAHLER
rrtre I, Surte 900
ast 400 South
It Lake City
tahA4111

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of August, 2009,1 caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing Order to be mailed, first-class postage prepaid thereon, to the
following:
Gerald H. Kinghorn
Catherine L. Brabson
Parsons Kinghorn Harris
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the

day of

2009,1 caused a true and

correct copy of the conformed Order to be mailed, first-class postage prepaid thereon, to
the following:
Gerald H. Kinghorn
Catherine L. Brabson
Parsons Kinghorn Harris
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
M. David Eckersley
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Clerk of the Court
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 52 Public Officers
* ! Chapter 6 Reimbursement of Legal Fees and Costs to Officers and Employees Act
*ffl Part 2 Attorney Fees and Court Costs
-t § 52-6-201. Indictment or information against officer or employee-Reimbursement of attorney
fees and court costs incurred in defense
(1) If a state grand jury indicts, or if an information is filed against, an officer or employee, in connection with
or arising out of any act or omission of that officer or employee during the performance of the officer or employee's duties, within the scope of the officer or employee's employment, or under color of the officer or employee's authority, and that indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or results in a judgment of acquittal, unless the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed upon application or motion of the prosecuting
attorney, that officer or employee shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and court costs necessarily
incurred in the defense of that indictment or information from the public entity, unless the officer or employee is
found guilty of substantially the same misconduct that formed the basis for the indictment or information

(2) If the officer or employee is acquitted of some of the charges or counts, or portions of the indictment or information are quashed or dismissed, that officer or employee shall be entitled to recover from the public entity
reasonable attorney fees and court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of those charges, counts, or portions
of the indictment or information that were quashed, dismissed, or resulted in a judgment of acquittal, unless the
misconduct covered by those charges, counts, or portions of the indictment or information that were quashed,
dismissed, or resulted in a judgment of acquittal is substantially the same misconduct that formed the basis for
charges, counts, or portions of the indictment or information of which the officer or employee was found guilty
(3) An officer or employee who recovers under this section shall also be entitled to recover reasonable attorney
fees and costs necessarily incurred by the officer or employee in recovering the attorney fees and costs allowed
under this section, including attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, an officer or employee may not recover for the costs incurred in defense of any charge, count, or portion of the indictment or information that is quashed or dismissed
upon application or motion of the prosecuting attorney

CREDIT(S)
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West No claim to ong U S govt
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 52. Public Officers
* ! Chapter 6. Reimbursement of Legal Fees and Costs to Officers and Employees Act
* ! Part 2. Attorney Fees and Court Costs
-• § 52-6-202. Payment of reimbursement of attorney fees and court costs
(1) A request for reimbursement of attorney fees and court costs shall be filed in the manner provided in Sections 63G-7-902 and 63G-7-903.

(2)(a) Any reimbursement of attorney fees and court costs filed on behalf of an officer or employee of the state
shall be paid from funds appropriated to the department or division that employed the officer or employee at the
time of the act or omission that gave rise to the indictment or information.
(b) If those funds are unavailable, the reimbursement shall be paid from the General Fund upon approval by
the Board of Examiners and legislative appropriation.
CREDIT(S)
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Formerly cited as UT ST § 63-30d-401

West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 63 G. General Government
*ii Chapter 7. Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Refs & Annos)
*il Part 4. Notice of Claim Against a Governmental Entity or a Government Employee
_t § 63G-7-401. Claim for injury—Notice-Contents-Service-Legal disability-Appointment of
guardian ad litem
(l)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(b), a claim arises when the statute of limitations that would apply if
the claim were against a private person begins to run.

(b) The statute of limitations does not begin to run until a claimant knew, or with the exercise of reasonable
diligence should have known:
(i) that the claimant had a claim against the governmental entity or its employee; and
(ii) the identity of the governmental entity or the name of the employee.
(c) The burden to prove the exercise of reasonable diligence is upon the claimant.
(2) Any person having a claim against a governmental entity, or against its employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of whether or
not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
(3)(a) The notice of claim shall set forth:
(i) a brief statement of the facts;
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted;
(iii) the damages incurred by the claimant so far as they are known; and
(iv) if the claim is being pursued against a governmental employee individually as provided in Subsection
63G-7-202(3)(c), the name of the employee.
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(b) The notice of claim shall be:
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and
(ii) directed and delivered by hand or by mail according to the requirements of Section 68-3-8.5 to the office
of:
(A) the city or town clerk, when the claim is against an incorporated city or town;
(B) the county clerk, when the claim is against a county;
(C) the superintendent or business administrator of the board, when the claim is against a school district
or board of education;
(D) the presiding officer or secretary/clerk of the board, when the claim is against a local district or special service district;
(E) the attorney general, when the claim is against the state;
(F) a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary, when the claim is
against any other public board, commission, or body; or
(G) the agent authorized by a governmental entity to receive the notice of claim by the governmental entity under Subsection (5)(e).
(4)(a) If an injury that may reasonably be expected to result in a claim against a governmental entity is sustained
by a claimant who is under the age of majority or mentally incompetent, that governmental entity may file a request with the court for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the potential claimant.
(b) If a guardian ad litem is appointed, the time for filing a claim under Section 63G-7-402 begins when the
order appointing the guardian is issued.
(5)(a) Each governmental entity subject to suit under this chapter shall file a statement with the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code within the Department of Commerce containing:
(i) the name and address of the governmental entity;
(ii) the office or agent designated to receive a notice of claim; and
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(iii) the address at which it is to be directed and delivered.
(b) Each governmental entity shall update its statement as necessary to ensure that the information is accurate.
(c) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall develop a form for governmental entities to
complete that provides the information required by Subsection (5)(a).
(d)(i) A newly incorporated municipality shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) promptly after
the lieutenant governor issues a certificate of incorporation under Section 67-la-6.5.
(ii) A newly incorporated local district shall file the statement required by Subsection (5)(a) at the time that
the written notice is filed with the lieutenant governor under Section 17B-1-215.
(e) A governmental entity may, in its statement, identify an agent authorized by the entity to accept notices of
claim on its behalf.
(6) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall:
(a) maintain an index of the statements required by this section arranged both alphabetically by entity and by
county of operation; and
(b) make the indices available to the public both electronically and via hard copy.
(7) A governmental entity may not challenge the validity of a notice of claim on the grounds that it was not directed and delivered to the proper office or agent if the error is caused by the governmental entity's failure to file
or update the statement required by Subsection (5).

CREDIT(S)
Laws 2008, c. 382, § 1498, eff. May 5, 2008; Laws 2009, c. 350, § 64, eff. May 12, 2009.
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 63G. General Government
* ! Chapter 7. Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Refs & Annos)
* ! Part 9. Coverage and Representation of State Entities and Employees
-+ § 63G-7-902. Defending government employee—Request-Cooperation—Payment of judgment
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a governmental entity shall defend any action brought against
its employee arising from an act or omission occurring:

(a) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(b) within the scope of the employee's employment; or
(c) under color of authority.
(2)(a) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a claim, the employee shall make a written
request to the governmental entity to defend the employee:
(i) within ten days after service of process upon the employee; or
(ii) within a longer period that would not prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining a defense on the
employee's behalf; or
(iii) within a period that would not conflict with notice requirements imposed on the entity in connection
with insurance carried by the entity relating to the risk involved.
(b) If the employee fails to make a request, or fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, including the making of an offer of judgment under Rule 68, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Offers of Judgment, the governmental entity need not defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay any judgment, compromise, or settlement against the employee in respect to the claim.
(3) The governmental entity may decline to defend, or, subject to any court rule or order, decline to continue to
defend, an action against an employee if it determines:
(a) that the act or omission in question did not occur:
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(i) during the performance of the employee's duties;
(ii) within the scope of the employee's employment; or
(iii) under color of authority; or
(b) that the injury or damage on which the claim was based resulted from conditions set forth in Subsection
63G-7-202(3)(c).
(4)(a) Within ten days of receiving a written request to defend an employee, the governmental entity shall inform the employee whether or not it shall provide a defense, and, if it refuses to provide a defense, the basis for
its refusal.
(b) A refusal by the entity to provide a defense is not admissible for any purpose in the action in which the
employee is a defendant.
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (6), if a governmental entity conducts the defense of an employee, the governmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon the claim.
(6) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee under a reservation of rights under which the
governmental entity reserves the right not to pay a judgment if any of the conditions set forth in Subsection (3)
are established.
(7)(a) Nothing in this section or Section 63G-7-903 affects the obligation of a governmental entity to provide insurance coverage according to the requirements of Subsection 41-12a-301(3) and Section 63G-7-802.
(b) When a governmental entity declines to defend, or declines to continue to defend, an action against its employee under any of the conditions set forth in Subsection (3), it shall still provide coverage up to the amount
specified in Section 31A-22-304.
CREDIT(S)
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
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West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 63G. General Government
*a Chapter 7. Governmental Immunity Act of Utah (Refs & Annos)
*1 Part 9. Coverage and Representation of State Entities and Employees
«t § 63G-7-903. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government employee
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered against him, or any portion of it, that the
governmental entity is required to pay under Section 63G-7-902, the employee may recover from the governmental entity the amount of the payment and the reasonable costs incurred in the employee's defense.

(2)(a) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee against a claim, or conducts the defense under a reservation of rights as provided in Subsection 63G-7-902(6), the employee may recover from the
governmental entity under Subsection (1) if the employee can prove that none of the conditions set forth in Subsection 63G-7-202(3)(c) applied.
(b) The employee has the burden of proof that none of the conditions set forth in Subsection 63G-7-202(3)(c)
applied.
CREDIT(S)
Current through 2009 General Session and 2009 First Special Session
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Ch. 245

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

[1000]

employed by a public entity, whether or not compensated, but does not
include an independent contractor.
(2) "Public entity" means the state or any political subdivision of it or
any office, department, division, board, agency, commission, council,
authority, institution, hospital, school, college, university, or other
instrumentality of the state or any such political subdivision.
Section 2. State officers or employees—Successful defense of grand jury
indictment—Reimbursement for reasonable legal fees and costs
incurred.
If a state grand jury indicts an officer or employee, in connection with or
arising out of any act or omission of that officer or employee during the
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment or under color
of his authority, and that indictment is quashed or dismissed or results in a
judgment of acquittal, unless the indictment is quashed or dismissed upon
application or motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or employee
shall be entitled to recover from the state the reasonable attorneys* fees and
court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of that indictment.
Section 3. Limited retroactivity.
This act shall apply to claims arising prior to the effective date of this act
so long as those claims are filed in the manner provided in the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act and within two years after the cause of action
arises.
Approved March 21, 1977.

CHAPTER 246
S. B. No. 272

(Passed March 10, 1977. In effect May 10, 1977
Failed to obtain 2/3 vote required for earlier effect)

FIRE MARSHALS AS PEACE OFFICERS
AN ACT ENACTING SECTION 63-29-27, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953; RELATING
TO THE STATE FIRE MARSHAL; PROVIDING THAT THE STATE FIRE
MARSHAL AND HIS DEPUTIES AND INVESTIGATORS SHALL BE VESTED
WITH POWERS OF PEACE OFFICERS.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section enacted.
Section 63-29-27, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read:
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63-30a-2. Indictment or information against officer or employee—Reimbursement of attorneys' fees and court costs incurred in defense.
If a state grand jury indicts or if an information is filed against an officer
or employee, in connection with or arising out of any act or omission of that
officer or employee during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
his employment or under color of his authority, and that indictment or information is quashed or dismissed or results in a judgment of acquittal, unless
the indictment or information is quashed or dismissed upon application or
motion of the prosecuting attorney, that officer or employee shall be entitled
to recover from the [state the] public entity reasonable attorneys' fees and
court costs necessarily incurred in the defense of that indictment or information.
Section 8. Section repealed and reenacted.
Section 63~30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 245,
Laws of Utah 1977, is repealed and reenacted to read:
63-30a-3. Request for defense or reimbursement.
A request for a defense of a criminal charge or indictment and for reimbursement of attorneys' fees and court costs shall be filed in the manner provided in section 63-30-11.
Section 9. Separability clause.
If any provision of this chapter or the application of any provision to any
person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder shall not be affected
thereby.
Section 10. Chapter repealed.
Chapter 48, Title 63, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is hereby repealed.
Approved March 30, 1983.

HEALTH
CHAPTER 132
H. B. No. 176

(Passed February 14, 1983. In effect May 10, 1983.)

ACCREDITATION INFORMATION
By Representative McKeachnie
AN ACT RELATING TO ACCREDITATION INFORMATION SUPPLIED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH BY HOSPITALS; PROVIDING THAT ACCREDITATION INFORMATION SHALL BE PRIVATE DATA.
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 26-21-9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY
CHAPTER 126, LAWS OF UTAH 1981.
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CHAPTER 131
H B No 290

(Passed March 10, 1983

In effect May 10, 1983 )

GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT MODIFICATIONS
By Representative McKeachme
AN ACT RELATING TO INDEMNIFICATION OF GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES; MODIFYING NOTICE REQUIREMENTS FOR CLAIMS AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES, AND APPLYING SUCH REQUIREMENTS TO CLAIMS AGAINST EMPLOYEES
FOR ACTS OR OMISSIONS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT; PROVIDING FOR
INDEMNIFICATION OF OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES AGAINST WHOM AN INFORMATION IS FILED; AND PROVIDING A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE.
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTIONS 63-30-11, 63-30-12, 63-30-13, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 27, LAWS OF UTAH 1978, AND SECTION 6330a-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 245, LAWS OF
UTAH 1977; ENACTS SECTIONS 63-30-36, 63-30-37, AND 63-30-38, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953; REPEALS AND REENACTS SECTION 63-30a-3, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 245, LAWS OF UTAH 1977; AND REPEALS
CHAPTER 48, TITLE 63, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section amended.
Section 63-30-11, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter
27, Laws of Utah 1978, is amended to read:
63-30-11. Claim for injury—Notice—Contents—Service—Legal disability.
(1) A claim is deemed to arise when the statute of limitations that would
apply if the claim were against a private person commences to run.
(2) Any person having a claim for injury [to person or property] against a
governmental entity or [its] against an employee for an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority shall, before maintaining an action [under this act],
file a written notice of claim with such entity [for appropriate relief including
money damages. The notice of claim shall set forth a brief statement of the
facts and the nature of the claim asserted, shall be signed by the person
making the claim or such person's agent, attorney, parent or legal guardian,
and shall be directed and delivered to the responsible governmental entity
within the time prescribed in section 63 30 12 or 63 30 13, as applicable.]
(3) The notice of claim shall set forth a brief statement of the facts, the
nature of the claim asserted, and the damages incurred by the claimant so far
as they are known, shall be signed by the person making the claim or such
person's agent, attorney, parent or legal guardian, and shall be directed and
delivered to the responsible governmental entity in the manner and within the
time prescribed in section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13, as applicable.
[Sendee of the notice of claim upon an employee of a governmental entity
*s not a condition precedent to the commencement of an action or special
proceeding against such person. If an action or special proceeding is com
nioncod against the employee, but not against the governmental entity, ser
^HM of the notice of claim upon the governmental entity is required only if
*ho entity has a statutory duty to indemnify such person.]
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after the date of the prescription unless
a
"jLved by the practitioner.
(iii) All other controlled substances in schedule V
be refilled as the preserver's prescription shall
ma/
!Tect, DUl i n n 0 e v e n l s n a ^ l n e y D e refilled one year
Iter the date the prescription was issued unless
* ncwed by the practitioner.
(iv) Any prescription for a schedule II, III, and
,V substance which is not presented to a pharmacist
for dispensing by a pharmacist or if an oral prescrnon, which is not obtained within ten days of the
date the prescription was written or authorized, may
not befilledor dispensed.
[fWl (g) Ari order for a controlled substance in
schedules"II through V for use by an inpatient or an
outpatient of a licensed hospital is exempt from all
requirements of Subsection (7) if the order is:
(i) authorized by the physician treating the patient
and designates the quantity ordered;
(ii) duly entered upon the record of the patient
and the record is signed by the prescriber affirming
his authorization of the order within 48 hours after
the filling or administering the order and the
patient's record reflects the quantity actually administered; and
(iii) filled and dispensed by a pharmacist practicing his profession within the physical structure of
ihe hospital or the order is taken from a supply
lawfully maintained by the hospital and the amount
taken from the supply is administered directly to the
patient authorized to receive it.
(8) No information communicated to any licensed
practitioner in an attempt to unlawfully procure, or
procure the administration of, a controlled substance is deemed to be a privileged communication.
Section 14. Section Amended.
Section 58-48-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 28, Laws of Utah 1985, is
amended to read:

As used in this chapter:
(1) 'Contest* means all live boxing contests,
matches, performances, sparring matches, or exhibitions, demonstrating the skill and ability of professional boxers, where an admission fee is charged.
Jl does not include amateur boxing contests as
defined by the Amateur Athletic Union.
means

Section 63-la-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 96, Laws of Utah 1985, is
amended to read:
63-la-8. Bond required - Terms - Expenses of
debtor.
(1) If a complaint is filed by the debtor for a
judicial review of an order entered under this
chapter, the debtor shall furnish a bond to the State
Tax Commission, with good and sufficient sureties,
in the amount of the delinquent receivable or the
amount of any overpayment or refund due, whichever is less, unless waived by the court. The lien
created by Section 63-la-6 is then dissolved as to
that overpayment or refund and the overpayment or
refund shall be released to the debtor.
(2) The bond shall provide that the surety will
pay, upon a final determination adverse to the
debtor, the amount of the bond or any other lesser
amount as the court may determine, to the State
Tax Commission for the use and benefit of the
entity of state government obtaining the order.
(3) If the judicial review finds the claim of the
state invalid, the state shall reimburse the [defen
data] debtor all reasonable expenses and attorney's
fees incurred.
Section 16. Section Amended.
Section 63-30a-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 131, Laws of Utah 1983, is
amended to read:
63-30a-.». Request for defense or reimbursement.
A recjuest for a defense of a criminal charge or
indictment and for reimbursement of attorneys' fees
and court costs shall be filed in the manner provided
in [section 63 30 11) Sections 63-30-36 and _63;
30-37.
Section 17. Section Amended.
Section 63-56-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as last amended by Chapter 170, Laws of Utah
1985, is amended to read:

5S-4M. Definitions.

(2) "Commission'
Commission.
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Section 15. Section Amended.

the

Utah

Athletic

0) "Director" means the director of the division.
W "Division" means the Division of [ftegk»fram Occu^ationaUnd[Professional I .icensing.

l

(5) "Professional boxer" means a boxer who
^ M c s for a purse.
se
lion
" mc ans any money, prize, remuncra»*Jr°r a n y o t n e r valuable consideration for which
ai>rof
^onal boxer competes.
UJ g r 0 S S r c c e i l s
Ibe f
P " means t , , e amount ol
^ * cc v a l u e of all tickets sold to a particular
hold! [? us anV sums received as consideration for
«"*contest at a particular location.

63-56-3. Compliance with federal law Exemptions from chapter.
(1) This chapter is not applicable to funds administered under the Percent-for-Art Program of
the Utah Percent-for-Art Act.
(2) This chapter is not applicable to grants
awarded by the state or contracts between the state
and local public procurement units except as provided in part I of this chapter.
(3) This chapter shall not prevent the state or a
local public procurement unit fiom complying with
the terms and conditions of mix grant, gift, or
bequest that is otherwise consistent with law.
(4) When a procurement involves the expenditure
of federal assistance or contract funds, the chief
procurement officer or head of ;• purchasing agenev
shall comply with mandatory applicable federal law
and regulations not reflected in I his chapter.
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(4) If, at the time the claim arises, the claimant is under the age of majority, or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, or imprisoned [at
the time the cause of action accrued], upon application by the claimant and
after hearing and notice to the governmental entity the court, in its discretion, may extend the time for service of notice of claimf^j, but in no event
shall it grant an extension which exceeds the applicable [general statutory
period of limitation applicable to the cause of action] statute of limitations. In
determining whether to grant an extension, the court shall consider whether
the delay in serving the notice of claim will substantially prejudice the governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the merits.
Section 2. Section amended.
Section 63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter
27, Laws of Utah 1978, is amended to read:
63-30-12. Claim against state or its employee—Time for filing notice.
A claim against the state or its employee for an act or omission occurring
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is filed with the
attorney general and the agency concerned within one year after the [cause of
action] claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted
under subsection 63-30-11 (4).
Section 3. Section amended.
Section 63-30-13, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by Chapter
27, Laws of Utah 1978, is amended to read:
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its employee—Time for filing
notice.
A claim against a political subdivision or against its employee for an act or
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after
the [CQUGO of action] claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of
time granted under subsection 63-30-11 (4).
Section 4. Section enacted.
Section 63-30-36, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read:
63-30-36. Defending government employee—Request—Cooperation—Payment
of judgment.
(1) Before a governmental entity may defend its employee against a claim,
the employee must make a written request to the governmental entity to
defend him and must make it within ten days after service of process upQQ
him or within such longer period as would not prejudice the flovernmental
entity in maintaining a defense on his behalf, or conflict with notice reqmrg:
ments imposed on the entity in connection with insurant carried by the
entity relating to the risk involved. If the employee fails to make a request^:
fails to reasonably cooperate in the defense, the governmental entity i§ngrequired to defend or continue to defend the employee, nor pay anyjugg:
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ment, compromise, or settlement against the employee in respect to the
claim.
(2) If a governmental entity conducts the defense of an employee, the
governmental entity shall pay any judgment based upon or any compromise
or settlement of the claim except as provided in subsection (3).
(3) A governmental entity may conduct the defense of an employee
under an agreement with the employee that the government entity reserves
the right not to pay the judgment, compromise, or settlement unless it is
established that the claim arose out of an act or omission occurring during the
performance of his duties, within the scope of his employment, or under color
of authority.
Section 5. Section enacted.
Section 63-30-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read:
63-30-37. Recovery of judgment paid and defense costs by government
employee.
(1) Subject to subsection (2), if an employee pays a judgment entered
against him, or any portion of it, which the governmental entity is required to
pay under section 63-30-36, the employee is entitled to recover the amount of
such payment and the reasonable costs incurred in his defense from the governmental entity.
(2) If a governmental entity does not conduct the defense of an employee
against a claim, or does conduct the defense under an agreement as provided
in subsection 63-30-36 (3), the employee may recover from the governmental
entity under subsection (1) if:
(a) The employee establishes that the act or omission upon which the
judgment is based occurred during the performance of his duties, within the
scope of his employment, or under color of authority, and that he conducted
the defense in good faith; and
(b) The governmental entity does not establish that the injury or damage
resulted from the fraud or malice of the employee.
Section 6. Section enacted.
Section 63-30-38; Utah Code Annotated 1953, is enacted to read:
63-30-38. Indemnification of governmental entity by employee not required.
If a governmental entity pays all or part of a judgment based on or a compromise or settlement of a claim against the governmental entity or an
employee, the employee may not be required to indemnify the governmental
entity for the payment.
Section 7. Section amended.
Section 63-30a-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 245,
Laws of Utah 1977, is amended to read:

